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Summary findings
Serrano explores the effects a transition from a pay-as-  Regardless of the initial distributions, reform of thc
you-go (PAYG)  social security system to a fully funded  type described here increases the level of physical capital
system may have on income distribution, fiscal policy,  in the economy. But the increase will be larger the larger
and capital accumulation.  the fraction of the population composed of poor
He presents a heterogeneous agent model developed to  individuals, or the higher their level of humnan  capital.
study the transition from a state-managed pay-as-you-go  He also finds that different initial distributions will
social security system to a privately managed fully funded  have different effects on the fiscal policy needed to
system. He assumes that agents can differ in their human  finance reform. Similarly, different forms of reform
capital endowments and in their access to the financial  financing will have different effects on iniragencrational
system.  distribution.
He finds that, for some initial distributions, when  In the case in which the government decides to
access to the financial system is restricted for some  maintain a constant level of debt, generations alive when
individuals, income distribution may improve with  the reform takes place will have lower lifetime earnings
privatization of the pension system.  than those born after them.
Where there is complete access to the finanacial  system  He also finds that the taxes needed to pay for
before reform, however, income distribution deteriorates  transitional workers'  pensions will be highier  when the
in all cases.  fraction of the population with access to the financial
system in the PAYG  equilibrium is higher.
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This paper explores the effects that a transition from a Pay-as-you-go  (PAYG)
social security system to a Fully-funded (FF) one may have on income distribution,
fiscal policy and capital accumulation.
There are several  studies  that analyze  the properties  of social security  systems  in
general. For  example, Feldstein [1974] and Hubbard et.  al.  [1995], use life cycle
models to  conclude that,  departing from  situations in  which  social security is
nonexistent,  introducing  unfounded  systems  reduces  private savings. Others, (Feldstein
and Sanwick  [1992]; Diamond and Mirrless [1978]) argue that these systems may
cause important distortions in  the  labor  supply'.  But apart  from these and other
potential  negative  effects, it is widely accepted  that the existence  of some sort of social
security  has important  benefits for societies. Diamond [1977] cites four main desirable
effects:  raising  revenue,  redistributing  income,  correcting  market  failures  and
paternalism. The market failures consist in the lack of private insurance against risks
associated  with retirement. Regarding  paternalism, he argues that many individuals  do
not save enough for retirement because of forecasting errors or irrational decisions;
governments  should help in providing  these savings  or should force individuals  to save
more. Mainly because of these types of arguments,  most countries  have social security
programs. Here we try to compare some important features of the two main types of
such  programs.
The existing theoretical literature arrives at the conclusion that a FF  system
leads to higher steady state levels of physical capital  than a PAYG. (See Arrau [1990];
Cifuentes  [1996] Gonzalez  [1996] and Kotlikoff [1996].) Corsetti and Schmidt-Hebbel
[1995] using an endogenous-growth  model; argue that the adoption of a FF system
leads to  a higher level of capital not only because its funded contributions  but also
because it will encourage  workers to become fornal.  In general, the starting points in
the literature are the Diamond  [1965]  overlapping  generations  model  and the Samuelson
[1958] model. In  their simplest version, a  sufficient condition for the transition to
increase  the steady state level of capital and the savings rate of the representative  agent
is the real interest rate being higher than the population  growth rate.
A large number of the studies dealing with the  macroeconomic  effects of a
transition of this type use the Auerbach  and Kotlikoff  [1987] framework  to simulate  the
path to a funded system. The Auerbach-Kotlikoff  model is an overlapping  generations
one in which the representative  agent lives for 55 periods. Realistic  values are assigned
to the model's parameters and simulations  are used to observe the effects of different
fiscal policies or other significant  changes like, for example, demographic  transitions.
All the studies  previously cited predict significant  increases  in the steady state values of
physical capital  and output following  the adoption  of a FF system.
In this paper, we introduce an overlapping  generations  model that departs from
the representative  agent assumption  and use simulations  to draw some conclusions  for
the Mexican case 2. It is important  to note, however, that this framework  is suitable  to
study social security reforms in general.  Two issues motivate  this departure from the
1 Perraudin  and Pujol (1994), model  these  distortions  for the case of Poland.
2 In 1992, Mexico  started a reform  process  of its social  security  system  that will mainly  consist  in
adopting  a privately-managed  fully funded  system.
1representative agent assumption. The first is that one of the main concerns, both inside
and outside academia,  is that this kind of reform may have negative effects on income
distribution.  (See for example, Diamond [1977] or The Economist [1996]). The reason
for this  concern is  simple:  in many countries,  PAYG social  security systems include
strong redistributional features in their design. For example, in the United States this is
one  of  the  main  reasons  why  authorities  do  not  seriously  consider  the  option  of
reforming  the  system 3,  even  though  this  one  is  facing  severe  financial  conslraints
because of its PAYG nature. In fact, in most countries the original idea of introducing
a social security system arises from a mainly distributional concern: to protect the poor
old. Therefore,  one way in which the agents in our model may differ is on their income
levels. Specifically, they differ in their endowments of human capital.
The second issue arises from the fact that there is evidence that, at least in some
developing countries, some poor people have demand for savings but they do nolt  have
access to the  financial  system because their  wealth  is  low  (for  example banks  often
require minimum deposits to open an account or some towns do not even have financial
institutions.)  But  still their  demand  for  savings  may  be  a  high  percentage  of  their
income.  If the fraction of the population with these characteristics is high, introclucing
these people  to  the  capital  accumulation  process  may have  important  effects  in  the
aggregate.
In the case of Mexico,  some poor people do not have the option of channeling
their  savings  through  the  formal  financial  system  because  many  institutions  require
large  initial  deposits  to  open  accounts.  Also,  there  are  substantial  penalties  for
maintaining low balances,  sometimes resulting in negative real  interest rates.  Or, in
some  rural  areas,  banks  or  other  financial  institutions  are  nonexistent.  But  as  we
already  mentioned  and  as  economic  theory  indicates,  having  low  income  does  not
necessarily  mean  having  low  savings.  As  we  know,  saving  means  exchanging
consumption in the present for consumption in the future and many of the reasons why
people save apply for poor people the same as for rich people i.e. deriving more utility
for future consumption, precautionary  savings, bequest motives,  etc.  The result is that
many agents who want to  save part of their current income have to use informal ways
to  channel  their  savings.  Manseil-Carstens  [1995]  shows  plenty  of  evidence  of  this
phenomenon for the Mexican case. She cites cases where workers ask their  supervisors
to retain part of their salaries as a way of safely maintaining their  savings - the places
where they live are not always safe to store cash. Another important way in which poor
people  save  is  through  lending  money  to  relatives  and  friends  at  low  but  positive
interest rates. In a survey realized by Mansell-Carstens with poor domestic workers, 56
percent  of  them  revealed  making a  loan in  the  previous  six months  to  relatives  or
friends.  Also,  some  workers  decide  to  save  by  buying  consumer  durables  such as
jewelry and electrical appliances. In the case of poor peasants, Mansell-Carstens reports
that a common savings method is that of acquiring  chicken and goats;  some reported
that  these animals  are  superior  as  saving  instruments than  others  such as  cows and
horses because they are more liquid:  "you cannot sell one part of a cow when you need
a little money"  stated one of her informants.  Our thesis is that many poor workers will
obtain  access to  the  formal  financial  system  through  the  privatized  social  security
system. And this idea is supported by the evidence: Mansell-Carstens reports that many
3  Several  studies,[Burkhauser  and Warlick, 1981;  Ferrara and Lott, 1985;  Boskin et. al., 1986; Rofman,
1993; Wolf,  1987] conclude that the United States social security system presents a clear progressive
income redistribution.
2workers obtained their first banking account via the  new system of  individualized
accounts. 4
The introduction  of an obligatory  FF system  may give these people access to the
financial system; now they can receive market interest rates on their savings. This
occurs if, like in the Chilean and Mexican cases 5, individuals are forced to deposit a
given amount on their private accounts, but are allowed to deposit more if they want
to.
Thus, the second way in which agents in our model differ is that, under the
PAYG equilibrium, poor agents (those endowed with less human capital) do not have
access to the financial system. This means that they do not receive interest on their
savings  and therefore participate  in the capital accumulation  process of the economy.
We  use the  model to  study the  effects that the  transition to  a  capitalized
retirement system may have on  income distribution, capital accumulation and fiscal
policy under the features described  above.  Section 2 of this paper introduces a model
in which agents live for 2 periods and shows simulations  that fit the Mexican case. In
section 3,  we follow Auerbach and Kotlikoff and present a more realistic model in
which agents live for 55 periods. Finally, section  4 concludes.
2. A Simple  Version  of the Model
This is an overlapping generations model with 2 representative  agents in each
generation, and in which 2 generations  coexist at every period of time. The agents in
this model  differ in two ways: they have different endowments  of human  capital, and in
this particular case, one type (type 2) does not have access to the fmancial system, so
she does not receive interest payments on her savings. The model is used to show the
effects on capital accumulation,  income distribution  and fiscal policy, when the social
security system  changes from a PAYG to a FF scheme.
In this first version, we assume that each generation lives for two periods, and
that individuals  only work during the first period of their lives. It is also assumed  that
the population  grows at a constant  rate n and for simplicity  we assume that the stock of
human capital stays constant  over time.
2.1  The economy  under the PAYG  system:
The production function is of the form:
Yt  =Kt  (H  Lt  h  aHLt)1-  (I)
4 Although  the reformed  funded  system  was fully enforced  in 1997, the system  of individual  accounts
was introduced  in 1992.
S For a complete  description  of the Chilean  reform,  see Diamond  and Valdes-Prieto  (1994).  For the
Mexican  case, see Sales et. al. (1996).
3Where  is the stock of human capital  owned  by agents of type i (constant  over
time for simplicity)  and L  is the fraction of the population  of type i alive at time t.  K,
is the stock of physical capital. Also, 0 <  ac  < 1.
In this economy, aggregate production takes place using physical capital and
two types of labor, provided by the two different types of agents. As we mentioned
before, each type of agent has a different endowment  of human capital; that is, they
have different types of skills that result in different  productivities.  Accordingly, agents
of type i provide, in period t, HELt of the total labor input.
Total population is the summation  of agents of types I and 2.  Of this total, a
fraction  ,f,  V  here 0 <  8 <  1,  is of type 1 and (1-A) of type 2:
L  =L 1 +L2 (2) t  I
1 =  L  and  L2 =(l-)L 1 (2')
Population  growth rate is given by n:
Lt = (I +  n)L,  (3)
Agents of type 1 own  y of the total stock of human capital  and agents of type 2
the rest.  One way to think about this is that there is a total stock of knowledge  and that
workers only have partial access to it. Alternatively, we can say that there are two
different sets of skills or two different forms in which workers can participate in the
production of an aggregate  homogeneous  good. We assume that agents of type 1 have a
larger endowment  of human capital, and therefore higher labor incomes,  than agents of
type 2. We will denote agents of type 1 as rich agents and agents of type 2 as poor
agents.
H=H 1 +H2 (4)
J1  = W  and  H2 =(I -yW  (4')
Where y>  0.5. We can interpret equations (2') and (4') as if they meant that
there are two representative agents in the  economy and that each of them owns a
11  2 2 fraction of the economy's total endowment  of units of effective labor (HJL, +HH  Lt)
that is proportional to  their respective shares of labor and human capital. In other
words, these equations  are equivalent  to saying  that agents of type 1 own a fraction 0 of
the economy's total endowment  of units of effective  labor, where
0=  2#  - (5)
4It should be noted that different compositions  of the population and different
distributions of the stock of human capital translate!  into' different levels of effective
labor and, therefore, into different output levels. This should be obvious: if there are
two economies  that have the same stock of human  capital and the same  population  size,
the one in which a higher fraction of its population  has a higher access to the stock of
human  capital will produce more.
Each generation has two representative agents each with logarithmic utility
function:
U  =fnC  +1  1  InC2 t  y,t  (l+p)  olt +1  i1,2  (6)
Where C'  is consumption  of agent i when young at time t and Ci  his }, t  icosmOlt  ±1
consumption  when old at time t+1.
Second  period consumption  for agent 1 is given by:
0,t+l=(lrt  + I *1-  r,)H'wi  Y', +  Hw(+  n)](7
and second  period consumption  for agent 2 is:
co t 1 [(1  Ts )H 2wt  - C] t ] +  [49Hw, (I +  n)]  (8)
where:
vp  = r,6+  O - r)(I - Af  (9)
The wage rate per unit of raw labor is given by w; that is, each worker's labor
income 6 is  this  wage rate  enhanced by  its productivity.  Ts  is  the  social security
contribution  rate. Equations  (7) and (8) imply that the system is strongly  redistributive;
it taxes both individuals  at the same rate and uses the revenues to pay equal pensions  to
current old individuals  of both types 7. Although a PAYG system does not necessarily
6 Income  for workers is given by their marginal  productivity.  So labor income  for each type of agent is
given by:
ayH,  Kt
'  = Hi (1-c) kt,  where kt  =  1  2  2
H  Lt  +  H  Lt
7 This result can be verified by dividing the total value of contributions to social security in one period
by the labor force size of the previous period:
t  wt(H  Lt  +  H  L2)
Lt  lt  '  (TH  wt (1 + n)
5has to be redistributive, this is the case in many social security systems in the wor]Ld.  In
most cases, the initial idea of introducing a social security system came from the desire
to redistribute income in favor of the poor and old individuals. In  Latin America,  for
example,  Argentina,  Brazil,  Venezuela,  Colombia and  in  Chile before  the early  80s
reform,  the PAYG  social security systems included important redistribution  schemes.
(Barreto de Oliveria [1994] and Vittas [1997]). In Europe,  Switzerland and, to a lesser
extent, Germany also have PAYG social security systems that are clearly redistributive.
(Queisser 1996).
It  should also be noted that,  contrary to models with homogeneous agents, the
implicit  rate of  return  of the  PAYG  system is different  from  the population  growth
rate. This  rate will be higher than n for poor  individuals (individuals of type 2 in our
model) and lower than n for  rich individuals.  Also, equation (8) reflects the fact that
poor individuals'  savings do not have access to the financial system and therefore  they
do not receive interest payments.
From equations (7) and (8), we can rewrite the budget constraints for each type:
CI  I  -79Hw  t(I +n)
c  t+  ,t+1  (l-  )H w  +  (71) Y,t  (I+ r  +,)  S  t  (+t
2  +2  2 CY t +C  t +I  =(1 - rs)HWw,  + r  sHwt  (1  + n)  (8')
Each agent maximizes (6) subject to  her respective budget constraint. Froim the
first order conditions we obtain consumption in each period for both types:
c1
_ =  P  ( l--)H  lw, +  5,Hw(I  '  n)]  (10)
Y,t 2+p  LO  (1r,+  ) 
C2 1 +P  [(0  - zs)H2w,  +±r  qHw,(I+n)]  (11) y,t  2±p
So that savings for each individual are given by:
I  1I  r  - P  (I - )Hlwt +  s W  t(In)]  (12)
S;  sW  +  1(l±rt+±)  I  12
S 2 = (1 - r  )H 2w  - 1+P  [(l  - rc)H 2Wt + zr,Hww  (1+ n)]  (13) t  S  I  +
The equilibrium condition for the economy is:
This is the pension that all old individuals,  no matter  their type, receive  at period t.
6K  -S  1 L  (14) t+l  - t  t
That is, only the savings that are channeled through the financial system are
accumulated  as capital and take part in the economy's production process. In  other
words, savings are not efficiently accumulated  as capital; this can be thought as if
capital were accumulated  at lower rates like when, for example the Tobin's q is low.
This phenomenon occurs mainly in developing countries, but it  is also present in
developed  economies. It should also be noted that contributions  to the social security
system are not saved  as capital; they are directly paid as pensions  to current old people.
This is the key feature of a PAYG system: it is a transfer system between different
generations.
Combining  equations (12) and (14) we can obtain an equation describing the
evolution of capital from period t to period t + 1.
K  I =  - (l -r)H  Ltw  _  -Ips  itw+lt  (15)
tl2+p  I  s  tf2+p  (I +rt+ )  I
Expressing  (15)  in  units  of  effective labor  by  dividing both  sides  by
11  22
(HYE  + H  Lt2
1  F  +  p Trfl(l+  n)] K -W  (I - +py(l+n)l(16)
K  1,  =-n  tl  -s6  2 + p  2+p(1±+rt+1)j
K 
wvhere  kt  + H2L2 is the  stock of capital per unit of effective labor.
t  I
Note that because the stock of human capital stays constant over time, the units of
effective  labor also grow at rate n.
The payments  to factors are given by:
w  (1 - a)ka  (17)
rt  ak (  (18)
Using these results, an equation that implicitly  describes  the evolution  of capital
can be obtained:
Kt +I  1  -- (1 - a)ka l(1  1  -)0_  2 +ap(+1  (19) L  s  2+oy  2±p(lak(a  )
7Finally,  the following equation  shows  kpc,  the  PAYG steady state  value of
capital per unit of effective labor in an implicit form.
-a)  ___-  10  1±p  r(l±+n)1
K(G  I  L  (  (-  S  (20)
PG  I+n  L  5  2+p  2+p(l+ak(ftal))j
2.2 The Fully-Funded System
When the  economy is at  this  steady state,  the goverminent introduces  the- FF
system. Under it, individuals have their own individual accounts in which they deposit
their  contributions to the social security. They are still obligated to deposit a fraction
T5  of their  labor  income.  When  they become  old  and retire,  they receive their  total
contributions  plus  an interest  payment  (pensions'  interest  rate  is equal  to  the rate  of
return on capital). So now the amount of each individual's  pension is only determined
by its own resources.  This means that the individuals of type 2 that did not have access
to  the financial system in the old scheme now have access through  then new pension
system. Also, under the laws of the new system, individuals are obligated to deposit a
minimum fraction  (equal tor  )  of their  labor income,  but  they can  deposit more  on
their accounts; this means that individuals of type 2 can channel all their savings to the
social security  system,  and therefore  receive interest  on all their  savings. We expect
that the introduction of this  system will have three different  effects on the income of
poor  individuals  (individuals of type 2):  first they will be  worse off because the new
system is no longer redistributive;  second,  they will better off because the new system
gives  them  access  to  the  financial  system  so  that  now  they  will  receive  interest
payments  on  its  savings,  and  finally,  they  may  benefit  from  changes  in  the  real
payments to  factors.  On the other hand,  we expect to  see an  increase in the stock of
physical capital due to two factors: first, as we explain below, the design of the funded
system implies an increase in capital accumulation and second, our assumption that the
reform will provide access to the financial  system to poor  individuals means that their
savings will also be accumulated as capital.
Now the agents face different budget constraints than before.  Equations (7) and
(8) now are:
CO t 1 (1 + r  +)L(1-  s)H'wt  -Ct  + (1 +  )rsH'wt  for i = 1,2  (21)
Notice that now the pension that individuals receive when old depends only on
their  own contributions  to  the  system.  The pensions  are equal to  these contributions
plus interest payments. We can obtain the new budget constraints:
c-
c  + t  +  =  (1- r )HIw, +  H'wt  for i=1,2  (21')
y,t  (I+ rt +1)  S  S 
Solving  the maximization problem,  we get consumption  in  period  1 for  both
types:
8CYt- 2  PHjwl  for i=1,2  (22)
and savings  for each individual  are:
Sw  2±  +  w  for i= 1,2  (23)
Total savings  in the economy  are:
St = EL  St  + L2S2 (24)
And the new the equilibrium  condition  for the economy  is:
Kt  1 = St +Dt  (25)
Where D, = zSw,(H'L4 + H2Lt)  is the total value of contributions made by the
young at time t. That is, now the contributions  to the social security system also form
part of the capital accumulation  process. This is the key difference between a fully
funded system  and a Pay-as-you-go  one, and the reason is that, the government,  instead
of using the revenues of the system to pay pensions to the current old, invests these
contributions  as capital in period t, and pays pensions to current old individuals with
the contributions  that were collected from them in period t-1. Now, the rate of return
on social security contributions  for all individuals is equal to  the real interest rate.
Also, in this new equilibrium,  all savings  are channeled  through this process. Replacing
(24) into (25) yields:
Kt+  = 1 =2p  wt[Hl  ±+H2 L2]  (26)
Expressing (26) in units of effective labor and replacing  for the value of labor
income yields the equation  that describes  the evolution  of capital in the FF case:
k~  I  1  (I  _.ka  7 t+  =(2+  p) (±+n)  t  (27)
It should be pointed out that this equation is the same for an economy without
any type of  social security, as long as the contributions  that have to be paid to the
system do not exceed the level of savings that individuals would have chosen in the
absence of social security. This happens  because now that social security contributions
go through the financial system, individuals have the  option of choosing the exact
allocation of consumption  between the two periods of their lives that they would have
chosen in the absence of social security: if they decide to consume a higher fraction of
their earnings when young, they are able to borrow against their future benefits at the
9market interest rates 8. This implies that increases in social security contribution rate
will be matched with decreases  in individual  saving rates.
Finally, the steady state level of capital  per unit of effective  labor in the FF case
is:
kf  V  1  1~(  -a()  a  (28)
if  L,h(2++  p) (  (  +  cn)  )]
2.3  Comparing  both Systems  under the Steady  State
In order to obtain a meaningful comparison  between both systems, we assign
realistic values to  the model's parameters in  order to  find numerical solutions. In
particular, v'  t; use values that resemble  the case of the Mexican  economy.
Table 1
Parameters in Base Case Scenario
Parameter  Value
Capital's  share  in  production  a= .5
Discount  rate  p=.03
Population  growth  rate  n=.02
Social  Securty  tax rate  -cs=  .115
Calibration
The share of capital in total income is represented by a.  From the Mexican
National  Accounts,  we know that this value has fluctuated  around 0.5 during the last 20
years. (See Arrau 1990). In the empirical literature, we find a great variety of estirmates
for the discount rate, p. (Auerbach  and Kotlikoff  [1987]; Hansen and Singleton  [19,83];
Haussman [1979] or Hubbard et.  al.  [1995]). Here we choose p=  0.03  which is
consistent  with many such studies. The population  in Mexico is expected to grow at an
approximate 2% rate for the next 30 years 9. And the value of the Social Security
contribution  rate that we choose is the one that will apply with the reform.  Finally, f
and y are, respectively, the fraction of the labor force that is skilled (rich agents) and
the fraction of the total stock of human capital that they own. Because of the lack of
empirical estimates for these variables, we use several different possible values for
them. Recall that we are not talking about the percentage of the population  that is poor;
we are talking about the percentage  of the labor force that is at the bottom part of the
wage spectrum  and does not have access to the financial  system.
8 Although  this is not a very  realistic  assumption,  we use it to show in a more clear way the effects  of
elimination  of liquidity constraints.
9 Source:  US Bureau  of the Census.
102.3.1  The Steady  State level of capital
In order to find the steady state values of capital  using our parameter  values, we
plot kt+l  against  kt  , or the right-hand side minus the left-hand side of equations (20)
and (28). This is shown in Figures 1 and lb. Table  2 shows  the effects of the reform on
capital per unit of effective  labor and the capital-output  ratio for different  combinations
of 13  and y. As can be expected, the effects of pension reform on the steady state level
of capital are larger the larger the fraction of the population  represented by agents of
type 2, or the lower the endowment  of human capital owned by them. It is interesting
to look at the case where y and ,B  are both equal to one. This is the homogeneous  agent
case. In this particular scenario, the reform increases  the steady state level of capital  by
38.4% and the capital-output ratio by  17.6. This means, that even in a case where
access to the financial system is unrestricted,  the adoption of a funded social security
system increases the long run level of physical capital. In the 1B  =  y  =  0.6 case, the
stock of capital  per unit of effective  labor is 1.8 times larger in the FF steady state than
in the PAYG one, and the capital-output  ratio is 67  % higher. In general, the increase  in
the stock of physical capital after the reform is larger the lower the fraction of the total
units of effective labor owned  by agents of type 2. In all cases  the reform to the social
security system leads to higher levels of capital per unit of effective labor and of the
capital-output ratios.  This  happens because,  in  the  FF  case,  contributions are
accumulated  as capital instead of being transferred to current pensioners. So even when
saving rates, as fraction of wages, do not increase, the economy will reach higher
levels of capital.
11Table 2
Steady State levels of capital and capital-output under both systemis
for different values of ,B  and y
Values of P  and y  kff  Kpy  % change  KtY ff  K/Y py  %change
0= .5, Y=.  5  0.0583  0.0109  434.86  0.2414  0.1044  131.27
0=.4, y=. 7 0.0583  0.0163  257.66  0.2414  0.1276  89.18
0=.6, y=  .6  0.0583  0.0207  181.64  0.2414  0.1438  67.87
0=.5, y=.7  0.0583  0.0214  172.42  0.2414  0.1462  65.05
0=.5, y=. 8 0.0583  0.0280  108.21  0.2414  0.1673  44.27
0=.7 y=.7  0.0583  0.0307  89.90  0.2414  0.1752  37.77
P= .6 , y=.8  0.0583  0.0319  82.75  0.2414  0.1786  35.15
P=.7, y=. 8 0.0583  0.0351  66.09  0.2414  0.1873  28.85
P=.5, y=.9  0.0583  0.0355  64.22  0.2414  0.1884  28.13
D=  .6, r=.9  0.0583  0.0377  54.64  0.2414  0.1941  24.33
3=.8,  y=.8  0.0583  0.0379  53.82  0.2414  0.1946  24.00
P= .7 , y=. 9 0.0583  0.0393  48.34  0.2414  0.1982  21.77
P=  .8,  e=  .9  0.0583  0.0405  43.95  0.2414  0.2012  19.95
3=.9,  Y=.9  0.0583  0.0414  40.82  0.2414  0.2034  18.568
0=1, Y=1  0.0583  0.0421  38.48  0.2414  0.2052  17.6  8
2.4 Income Distribution
As discussed before, one of the main concerns regarding the privatization of
social security systems is that income distribution  will deteriorate, in particular hurting
the poor  old.  James (1997) argues that  unless the  privatization program  contains
explicit redistributive mechanisms, income distribution may deteriorate.  Arrau and
Schmidt-Hebbel  (1994), in  an overview of the  Pension literature, point that miuch
research is needed in order to  have a more clear idea of how pension privatization
affects  income distribution. (For an example  of this view in the United States see L1eone
[1997]). One of the purposes of this paper is to study this issue.  In our context, it is
difficult  to predict a priori the effects of the reform. We saw that what happens  to poor
agents is uncertain and the same is true for rich agents: on the one hand they are better
off because they do not have to subsidize  redistributional  pensions to poor agents. But
on the other hand, we know that there will be changes in the relative prices of factors
and that this may have negative effects on their wealth. Here we will measure income
distribution as the ratio of rich agents' over poor agents' present value of lifetime
incomes.
12The present value of lifetime  income for agents of type 1 in the PAYG steady
state is:  (I - -s)H  wPG + TsVHwPG(l +  n)  and the equivalent expression for agents of
2  1swPG(l  +n) / type  2  is:  (1  - s)H  WPG  +  sY  JPG(l  r+)  -where  rG  and  wPG  are
respectively the  steady state levels of the  interest rate and wages. With these two
expressions, we can  obtain the  ratio of  present value earnings of  rich over poor
individuals, which is given by:
(I + rPG)[Y (l -'T s) + csf(p1  +  n)]
[(i -r)(  -y)(l  + rPG) + rSq(l + n)]
From this expression, we can obtain the condition  under which agents of type 1
will have higher lifetime  earnings  than agents of type 2. This condition  is:
1  T5(D + n)rpG
722(1±+  rPG)(1  - T5)
This condition means that  ,  because of the  redistributional  features of  the PAYG
system, being endowed with a  higher level of human capital  (y >  .5),  is not a
sufficient  condition  for agents of type 1 to have higher lifetime  earnings than agents of
type 2: income inequality is not only determined  by inequalities  in labor earnings, but
also by capital  earnings and by the design of the social security  system.
In the FF case, the ratio of present value of lifetime incomes of rich over poor
individuals  is just:
(-r)
That is, because the FF system is not redistributional  at all, having a larger
endowment  of human capital is a sufficient  condition to have higher lifetime earnings.
So if y >  1/2 (which was already assumed), individuals of type 1 will have higher
income, in present value, than individuals  of type 2.
Following  this argument, the reform of the social security system will improve
the distribution of income (will make it more equal) if the ratio of lifetime earnings
between rich and poor agents is lower in the FF steady state  than in the PAYG one.  I 0
Table 3 shows the percentual  change of the ratio of rich to poor agents' income
for different values of f3  and y. The first two columns show this ratio under the steady
state in the FF  and PAYG systems respectively and the third one is the percentual
change between them. The different combinations  of [3  and y are ordered according to
the size of change in income distribution  after the reform to the social security system.
A negative change means more income equality between agents of both types. For
example the [  =  0.5, y =  0.5 case is the one in which there is more redistribution
10 Because the solution for the steady state level of capital may not be unique, an analytical condition for
improvements on income distribution cannot be derived.
13after the reform (the ratio goes from 1.2 to 1, that represents  complete  equality) and the
,  =  0.9,  y  =  0.9  case is the one  in which  income inequality gets worst - the iratio
increases by  17.27%. We  can  see that the  redistributive effect of  the  reforn  is
decreasing with y,  the  fraction of  the  total  stock of  human capital in  hands of
individuals  of type 1. This result predicts that a reform of the type described  here will
deteriorate  income inequality  if large gaps between the skills of workers  exist. Also, for
any given y, a lower ,B  will mean a more equal income structure  after the reform. This
is because, the lower the value of ,B  means a higher increase in the stock of physical
capital in the FF steady state and consequently, a lower interest rate; therefore, for
given differences  in labor earnings, the gap in capital earnings will be lower.  When
the share of the total stock of units of effective labor in hands of rich agents is higher
than 80  %, income distribution  worsens  after the reform.
It is interesting  to give a closer look at the ,B=0.5, y=0.5 case. When agents of
both types represent exactly half the population size and own half the stock of human
capital, their lifetime incomes  are the same in the FF steady state. They are different in
the PAYG system because agents of type 2 have no capital gains.  Thus this case
depicts  a sitration in which income inequality  is explained  only by differences  in capital
income and not at all by differences  in labor income. In this case, given our thesis that
the reform to the social security system will provide access to the financial system,
income inequality  disappears  after the reform.
Table 3
Ratio of Rich to Poor Individuals'  Income under  both Systems
for different  values of ,B  and y
Values of P and Y  (11/12)ff  (11/12)pg  % Change
P=.5  y=.5  1.00  1.10  -9.68
0=-6,  y=.6 1.50  1.61  -6.84
0=.4,  y=.7  2.33  2.44  -4.20
P=5,  7y=7  2.33  2.43  -4.08
P=.7 , y=.7  2.33  2.42  -3.90
P=.5, 7=.8  4.00  3.99  0.022
P=.6,  y= 8  4.00  3.98  0.44
P=f7,  y=.8  4.00  3.96  0.84
P=.8, 7=.8  4.00  3.95  1.22
P=-5 , y=-9  9.00  8.17  10.03
P=.6, y=.9 9.00  8.03  11.94
P=.7, y=.9  9.00  7.91  13.77
P=-8 , Y= 9  9.00  7.78  15.55
P=.9, Y=. 9 9.00  7.67  17.27
142.5  Poverty
Apart from looking at changes in income distribution, we would like to see if
the poor agents in our model are better or worse off after the transition. As we said
before, there are effects going in opposite directions so we can not know the overall
result a priori. Here we compare the net wealth's present value for the representative
poor agent under both equilibria.
As we already noted, in the PAYG steady state, the present value of income for
2  -c(HwPG(l +n)  / poor agents is : (1  - r)HwPG  +  sHPG  /(l+  )-  And the equivalent  of this
2 expression  in the FF case is: H  w . Therefore, agents of type 2 will be better off after
the transition if:
-Wif  rs  q{l  n)
[(1  Ts)I  +  r 
W,p,  (  py
where w  and wpy are the equilibrium  wage rates for the FF and PAYG systems and
rff  is the equilibrium  interest rate in the PAYG steady state. This expression  says that
having higher labor incomes after the transition is not a  sufficient condition for an
increase in lifetime income for poor agents; the access to the financial system and the
loss of redistributive  pensions also need to be taken into account. Table 4 shows the
present value of lifetime income for individuals  of type 2 under both systems and the
percentual change between them after the transition for different values of ,B  and y. In
all cases, poor individuals are better off after the reform. The increase in the stock of
physical capital means increases  labor productivity  enough to improve lifetime  earnings
for poor individuals. Of course, this improvement  is larger the larger is the fraction of
the total stock of effective labor owned by individuals of type 2.  Even though the
effects of pension reform on social security on income distribution may be uncertain,
poor individuals  will be better off in absolute terms because the reforn  will translate
into higher labor productivity.
15Table 4
Poor Individuals' Income under both Systems
for different values of ,B  and y:
Values  of j  and y  12 pg  12  ff  % Change
=.5,  y=.5  0.046  0.120  159.77
0=.6,  7=.6  0.064  0.120  88.51
P=.4, 7=.7  0.056  0.120  112.43
P=.5,  y=.7  0.065  0.120  85.40
3=.7, y=.7  0.078  0.120  54.80
=.5, y=.8  0.074  0.120  62.09
,B=.6, y=.8  0.079  0.120  51.86
=.7,  y=.8  0.083  0.120  44.77
P=.8,  y=.8  0.086  0.120  39.33
P=.5  y=.9  0.083  0.120  43.95
P=.6,  y=.9  0.086  0.120  39.69
3=.7,  y=.9  0.088  0.120  36.82
3=.8  y=.9  0.089  0.120  34.78
D=9  9,  Y=.9  0.090  0.120  33.32
2.6 Complete  access  to the Financial  System
We now  consider  the case in  which  inequality  in the  endowments of  human
capital exist but in which all agents have access to the fimancial system. This case will
resemble a more advanced economy with a developed financial system.
When all agents have access to the financial system, the increase in the stock of
capital per unit of effective labor after the reform is that of the homogenous agent case
for all different  values of D and y: the savings of all individuals are channeled through
the fmancial  system.  However,  the implications for income inequality between agents
of both types are different.  Individuals of type 2 already receive  interest payments on
their  savings in the PAYG system.  After  a social security reform of the type we are
considering  here, they will be worse off with  respect to  agents of type  1 because the
new system will no longer be  redistributive.  Table  4  shows the same variables  as in
Table  3 for  the case in  which  all  agents have access to  the  financial  system  in  the
PAYG equilibrium.  It can be seen that in all cases income inequality increases. Again,
this inequality will be larger the higher is the fraction of the stock of units of effective
labor owned by  agents of type  1. In the extreme case, when ,B  =y  =  0.9  the ratio of
lifetime income between the two agents increases by 86%.  When there is a developed
financial system in which all agents have access to it, a reform to the social security of
the type described here will always increase income inequality.
16Table 5  1
Ratio  of Rich to Poor  Individuals'  Income  under  both  Systems
for different  values of ,  and y:
Complete  Access to the Financial  System
Values of f  and y  (11/12)ff  (11l2)pg  % Change
0=.5,  y=.5 1.00  1.00  0.00
0=.6,  y=.6  1.50  1.43  5.15
3=4.  y=.7  2.33  2.11  10.68
0=.5,  y=.7  2.33  2.09  11.53
0=.7  y=.7  2.33  2.06  13.19
=.5, Y.8  4.00  3.25  22.95
*=.6  y=.8  4.00  3.19  25.47
a=3  y=.8  4.00  3.13  27.95
P=.8  Y  /.8  4.00  3.07  30.38
=.5,  Y=.9  9.00  5.81  54.87
=.6,  y=.9  9.00  5.52  62.96
p=.7,  y=. 9 9.00  5.27  70.87
P=.8, y=.9  9.00  5.04  78.62
.9'  Y=.9 9.00  4.83  86.20
2.7 The role of Fiscal Policy in the Reform
In our model, the government is only concerned with the social security system.
It only collects taxes that will be used to finance the system. So far,  the only role that
the government  has in  the  PAYG  steady state equilibrium  is to  realize  the transfers
from  young to  old  individuals,  and  it has no  active role  in the FF  equilibrium.  In  a
social security reform of this type,  however,  the government plays a fundamental role
in the transition path from one steady state to the other. If the government has to meet
the  obligations  acquired  with  transition  workers,  as  is  the  case  with  the  Mexican
reform,  it needs to generate revenues in order  to pay pensions to these workers.  This
changes substantially some of the results presented  above. If the government assumes
this debt, the steady state that the economy reaches after the reform will be lower.  This
is because the capital stock  is determined not  only by private  wealth but  also by  the
economy's  total wealth, that is private plus public. This explicit debt means a negative
public wealth that crowds out the national capital stock. For example, if the authorities
decide to switch to a FF  system at time t, they will have to pay pensions to current old
individuals that contributed to the system in period t-l,  but now they will not collect
contributions  from  current  young workers;  at this time  young individuals are making
their social security contributions to their own individual accounts. In this  section, we
17study a reform on social security in the case in which government recognizes this debt.
We  introduce  an  income  tax that  will  generate  government  revenue.  The  following
equation describes the government's  debt position across time:
B 1~~~ 1 =B  1~~I1  2 2 Bt1  B(I  ±rt)+G,  -[rw  t(H  L; +HH  Lt)+  -tYt]  (29)
WhereBt  and Gt are government's  debt and expenditures at time t respectively,
and  rt is  the income  tax rate  at period  t.  In the  case of  the unfounded  system,  the
income tax rate is zero and government expenditures,  Gt  , are the pensions paid to old
individuals which are equal to the contributions made by the young:
11  22  211 Gt = (1I+  n)-r wt _l(L  +22  =T  HLEl +H2L2)
This means that, because the only concern for the government in this economy
is the pension  system, there is no change in the level of debt, and in the PAYG steady
state Bt + I equals Bt  . (For simplicity, we assume the initial debt level equal to zero.)
When  the  government  issues  debt,  it  crowds  out  private  savings.  (People  see
investments  in  government  bonds  and  in  private  financial  markets  as  perfect
substitutes.) Therefore, equations (14) and (25) now become:
Kt + I = St1t  - Bt + 1  (14')
t1~  t  1  2(+1
Kt +  I = [Lt  (S; +  Dt) +  Lt (S  +  D)-  Bt +  1 (25')
Where  Dt  are the contributions made to the social security by an individual of
type  i.  Again,  this  is  the  key  difference  between  both  systems.  Whereas  in  an
unfounded  system  social  security's  contributions  do  not  take  part  in  the  cazpital
accumulation  process,  in  a  funded  system,  not  only  people's  extra  savings"  are
accumulated as capital, but also are the contributions themselves.  This is why a Fully-
Funded  social  security  system  leads  to  higher  levels  of  capital  and  not,  as  it  is
sometimes believed, because reforming the system creates incentives for individuals to
save  more.  As  we show  here,  the adoption  of  a FF  system will  mean  more capital
accumulation even if the savings rates, as proportion of labor incomes, do not change.
If the reformn  to a funded system happens in year t=R,  government debt will be
equal to the value of pensions paid to individuals that are old at time R. From equation
(29):
BR =TSWR _1H_  LH  +  H2L  H 2)  (30)
BR is the fiscal cost of the reform. This cost,  as a fraction of the reform's  year
income, is equal to:
n  Those  made  in addition  to the required  contributions.
18B
R  = T5(0-)  (31)
YR  s
In our base case scenario this cost is equal to 5.75 % of the GDP in the period in
which the authorities switch to a funded system. For the contribution rate prevailing in
Mexico,  the cost of the reform  can amount up to  11.5%  of GDP,  depending on the
value of uc. Although these values of the fiscal cost may seem big,  we will see in the
next section that they are sub estimated because they are obtained from  a two period
model. If  the government  recognizes its  debt with individuals that  contributed to  the
system in the past,  it will have to pay pensions to more than one generation and,  more
important, for more than one period.  Obviously, if the government assumes this debt,
12 the capital accumulation gains will be lower.
As  we just  stated,  this  burden  will  have  some  crowding  out  effect  on  the
economy's  capital stock.  Following  equations (25')  and  (30),  we can find the  steady
state of capital for the FF  system. First,  we express the evolution of government  debt
in  per  capita terms,  taking into  account that  after  the reformn  government  no longer
collects social security contributions, that is,  T5  = 0 for t>  R.
bt  +1  I  (I+n)[  t(,+frt) +gt +-.rtYI  32
where variables in lower case are in terms of units of effective labor. Therefore,
the fiscal cost of the reform in percapita terms is:
b=s  PG  (3
hR  (  +n)  (33)
Where  wPG  is the wage rate at the Pay-as-you-go steady state. Also, because
agents now face an income tax, the equation describing the motion of capital per unit of
effective labor now becomes:
1  1  a
tt+1  (  +  n)  2  -)  l(k  -bt+l  (34)
The government has several different alternatives to finance the transition cost.
It  can, for example, apply very high income rates in order to pay the cost faster,  thus
making current generations and those born in the near future to pay the reform's  cost.
Or it may choose to make generations in the long future to  share part  of the cost by
using  low  income  tax  rates  and  spreading  the  cost  during  several  periods.  Each
different form of financing the transition will have different effects on intergenerational
distribution and on capital evolution. Here  we will consider the following government
action:  imposing an income  tax each period in  order  to maintain  a  constant level  of
government  debt per  unit of effective labor. This implies applying an  income tax rate
equal to:
12 In practical terms, it would be politically impossible not to recognize this debt. Although so doing
reduces the stock of capital, those benefited will mostly be living generations.
19b  (r  +n)
R  t  fort  > R.  (35)
yt
Consequently, the  stock of  capital per  unit of  effective labor will  evolve
according  to the following  nonlinear difference  equation:
kt + I =  I  1  - (I:x a)(1-  [bR(ak(a)  +n)/k'  ])ka  - bR  (34'1)
Table 6 shows  the steady states levels of capital  per unit of effective  labor when
the  government recognizes its  debt  with  past  contributors and  uses the  strategy
described  above to finance  this debt.  One important  change is that the steady state that
the economy reaches with the FF system depends, in contrast with the previous case,
on the initial level of capital, that is, on the PAYG steady state. We can see that the
higher the fraction of the population  that does not have access to the financial systern,
the higher the steady state level of capital per unit of effective labor that the economy
reaches after social security privatization; that is,  the economy not only reaches a
higher level of capital relative to the PAYG level, but it also reaches a higher absolute
level. This result strengthens  the conclusion that the benefits from privatizing social
security, in terms of capital  accumulation  are higher the higher are the imperfections  in
the capital markets, that in this case are reflected as parts of the population being
segregated  from the financial  system.
Of course, the steady state levels of capital and income are lower when the debt
with past contributors  to the system  becomes  explicit. This is because government  debt
crowds out private savings. The effect of recognizing  this debt is shown in Figure 2.
We can see, for example, that in the  homogeneous  agent case, capital per unit of
effective labor increases  by 12.82% after the transition to a fully-funded  system; this is
substantially  lower than the 38.48  %
increase obtained when obligations  with past workers were not assumed. Comparing
Tables 2 and 6,  we can see that this result holds for every combination  of f3  and y
shown.
The table also shows  that the capital-output  ratios are higher after the transition,
but lower than in the previous non-debt  case. In the single agent case, this ratio is equal
to 0.21 in the FF case: an increase  of 5.85%.
20Table 6
Steady State levels of capital and capital-output under both systems
for different values of j  and y:
explicit government debt
Values of P  and y  kff  kpy  % change  KJY  ff  KJY  py  %change
3= .5, y=.5  0.0526  0.0109  382.57  0.229  0.104  119.67
P=.4, y=  .7  0.0514  0.0163  215.34  0.227  0.128  77.58
P=.6,  y=. 6 0.0506  0.0207  144.44  0.225  0.144  56.35
3=.  5, y=.7 0.0504  0.0214  135.51  0.224  0.146  53.46
P=.5, y=.8  0.0494  0.0280  76.43  0.222  0.167  32.83
P=.7  y=.7  0.0490  0.0307  59.61  0.221  0.175  26.34
3=  .6 , y=.8  0.0488  0.0319  52.98  0.221  0.179  23.68
0  =.7, y=. 8 0.0484  0.0393  23.16  0.220  0.198  10.98
P=5, y=.9 0.0483  0.0355  36.06  0.220  0.188  16.64
P= .6 , y=.9  0.0481  0.0377  27.59  0.219  0.194  12.95
3=.8,  y=.8  0.0480  0.0379  26.65  0.219  0.195  12.54
P= .7,  y=.9  0.0478  0.0393  21.63  0.219  0.198  10.29
3=.8, y=.9  0.0477  0.0405  17.78  0.218  0.201  8.53
P=.9,  y=.9  0.0476  0.0414  14.98  0.218  0.203  7.23
P=1,7=1  0.0475  0.0421  12.82  0.217  0.205  5.85
Table  7  shows the value of the transition  cost,  bR,  as percentage of  reform's
year capital and output per  unit of effective labor as well as the income tax rate that
would be  required in the FF  steady state in order  to keep the public debt constant in
terms of units of effective labor. The transition cost is higher, as a percentage of capital
per  capita,  the higher is the fraction of the population that has access to the financial
system.  On the other hand,  as explained above, the cost as a fraction of the output per
unit of effective labor in the year of the reform is the same for different combinations
of ,B  and y. In the homogeneous agent case, this cost represents 27.47%  of the stock of
capital  per  unit  of  effective  labor  and  5.63%  of  the  economy's  output per  unit  of
effective labor. This figure is, in contrast, 53.99 for the case in which poor agents own
50% of the economy's  stock of human capital and represent 50% of the population.  As
a consequence, the income tax rate that is required to keep the level of debt unchanged
increases with the degree of initial human capital equality and with the fraction  of the
population  with access to financial markets. In the single agent case, this rate is equal
to  12.26%, whereas in the f3=y=0.5  case the rate is equal to 5.64%; social security
reforms may require big fiscal reforms. 13
13 In this case, we are assuming that the government had no previously accumulated assets. In most
cases, however, countries decide to privatize social security before running out of reserves. This
obviously would imply lower tax rates.
21Table 7
Transition Cost as percentage of Output and Capital per unit of
effective labor and Income Tax Rate required for constant Debt for
different values of D and y
Values of f and y  Costk  (%)  Costy  (%)  Tff
P= .5,  y=.S  53.99  5.63  5.64
0=.4,  y=.7  44.15  5.63  7.63
=.6, y=.6  39.18  5.63  8.08
=.5, y=.7  38.53  5.63  8.24
=.5, y=.8  33.68  5.63  9.63
0=.7  y=.7  32.17  5.63  10.16
3=  .6,  y=.8  31.56  5.63  10.39
j=.7,  y=.8  30.08  5.63  11.00
=.5, y=.9  29.91  5.63  11.07
=  .6,  y=.9  29.03  5.63  11.48
f=.8,  y=.8  28.95  5.63  11.51
f= .7 , y=.9  28.43  5.63  11.77
=.8, y=.9  28.01  5.63  11.98
P=.9, y=.9  27.70  5.63  12.14
P=1 y=1  27.47  5.63  12.26
2.8  The Transition Path
The previous  analysis looked only at the characteristics of the economy at both
steady states. It is also interesting to study the behavior of several variables during  the
transition  path from  one system to  the other. It  is also of particular  interest to  know
how long it takes to get from one steady state to the other.
Equation  (34')  can be  used  in  order  to  follow  the  behavior  of  the  economy
during  the transition  path.  Using the steady state level of capital per  unit of effective
labor of the PAYG equilibrium as the initial level of capital and the transition  cost as
the initial level of debt,  we can obtain the level of capital for  each  successive period
after  the reform.  Table  8 shows the evolution of the wage rate,  the  intereslt rate,  the
level of capital per unit of effective labor and the income tax rate during the transition
form a PAYG social security system to a FF one when the government decides to keep
the  level  of  debt unchanged.  For  simplicity,  we  make  the  initial  (PAYG)  levels  of
capital, wages and interest rates equal to one.
22Table 8
The Economy during the Transition Path:
Homogeneous Agent Case
Period  Capital  Debt  Tax rate  Wage  Int. rate
0  1  0  0  1  1
1  1.176  0.274  11.78%  1.084  0.892
2  1.152  0.274  12.03%  1.073  0.905
3  1.140  0.274  12.15%  1.067  0.912
4  1.134  0.274  12.21%  1.065  0.915
10  1.128  0.274  12.26%  1.062  0.918
Steady  State 1.128  0.274  12.26%  1.062  0.918
Table 8a
The Economy during  the Transition Path:
3=y=0.8
Period  Capital  Debt  Tax  Wage  Int. Rate
0  1  0  0  1  1
1  1.240  0.289  11.77%  1.113  0.860
2  1.254  0.289  11.64%  1.120  0.853
3  1.261  0.289  11.58%  1.123  0.849
4  1.264  0.289  11.55%  1.124  0.848
10  1.268  0.289  11.53%  1.126  0.846
Steady  State  1.268  0.289  11.52%  1.126  0.846
23Table 8b
The Economy during the Transition Path:
J3=y=0.6
Period  Capital  Debt  Tax  Wage  Int. Rate
0  1  0  0  1  1
1  1.678  0.391  11.76%  1.295  0.695
2  2.038  0.391  9.69%  1.427  0.607
3  2.236  0.391  8.83%  1.495  0.569
4  2.339  0.391  8.45%  1.529  0.551
10  2.442  0.391  8.26%  1.562  0.535
Steady State 2.444  0.391  8.17%  1.563  0.534
As  Tables 8,  8a  and  8b show,  the economy  reaches its  new  steady  state ten
periods  after the reform.  Most of the change, however,  occurs after 3 periods.  At this
point,  it is important to  realize that  one period  here is the entire  working  life of  an
individual, in a more realistic context,  it would be  equivalent to some 40 to 45 years.
These transitions might take a long time.  Table 8a shows the transition for the ,B= y =
0.8 case. As it was mentioned before, in this case social security reform leads to a new
steady state where the stock of capital per unit of effective labor is 26.8% higher. ]But,
as the  Table  shows,  almost  80%  of  this  increase  happens  by  the  second periodl. It
should also be noted that,  as expected, as the stock of capital grows,  the income  tax
rate decreases. Also,  the wage rate increases as the extra capital makes workers more
productive;  at the same time the interest rate falls.  In this case, interest  rate falls by
34.1 % and wages increase by 12.6% after the transition is over.
The single agent case is somewhat different.  As Table 8 shows, capital per unit
of effective labor increases by 17.6 % the period after the reform.  Then the high debt to
capital ratio crowds out capital the following periods until the economy reaches the slew
steady state where  the stock  of capital  is higher  than in  the  Pay-as-you-go  case but
lower that in the first period after the reforn.  In this case, the income tax rate increases
with time: future generations pay a higher portion of the transition cost. The Table also
shows that the wage rate increases by 6.02 % and the interest rate decreases by  16%
As we mentioned earlier, one of the problems with the 2 period model is that it
underestimates the cost of the transition because it implies that the government only has
debt with one generation. Consequently the transition path will be different.  In the next
section we present more realistic transition paths.
3. An Extended  Version  of the Model
In  this  section,  following  Auerbach  and  Kotlikoff  (1987),  we  introduce  an
extended version  of the model previously presented.  The extension mainly consists in
introducing realistic life span periods.  Specifically,  individuals will live for 55 periods
instead of 2.  This  life span is realistic since the model  assumes that individuals  start
24working immediately  after they are born; this equivalent  to think that individuals  start
working at age 21, work for several years of their lives, retire and die at age 75.  14
This implies that, at any given period in time,  there will be 55 different generations
alive. We still hold the assumption of 2 types of individuals in each generation, and
that of poor agents not having access  to the financial system. This extended version of
the model will provide a more clear idea of the development  of the economy  during the
transition  path from one system to the other. Also, it will allow us to put together the
elements discussed above - fiscal policy, income distribution, etc.  In  addition,
introducing more realistic lifetime spans some insights are gained, for example, as
Auerbach  and Kotlikoff  point out: "interest  rate changes  may alter the present value of
lifetime  labor earnings."
Individuals of both types will maximize their lifetime utility. Again, we use
logarithmic  utility functions. Lifetime utility functions  are given by:
UZ =IL  (  l  ))  In C'i  i=1,2  (36)
That is, each individual  lives for 55 periods and has a constant discount factor
during his entire life 15. Individuals of type 1,  (rich individuals) face the following
budget constraint:
I  1I  1  1  1 at+ I  + rt)at+  Q(1  - T)h'wt  + pt - (rtat +h  wt) - ct = 0  (37)
where at  are financial assets held by an individual  of type i at period t.  Pt is
the retirement  pension received by the individual  at time t. It should be noted that the
amount  of pension payment  does not depend  on the individual's type; again this reflects
the redistributive  character of the system: individuals  are taxed according  to their labor
incomes and receive an equal pension at retirement. The remainder variables are the
same as in the previous section.  16
And the budget  constraint  faced by individuals  of type 2, when the PAYG
system prevails, is given by:
a,+l  =at  + (-as  wt + P  -2t-  c2 =  (38)
Again,  it  should be  noticed that these  individuals do  not  receive interest
payments on their savings. All agents retire at age R. Each person will receive wages
only during his working years and pension  payments  only during his retirement  years:
ht =0  fort=R+1,  ...,T.
14 We use this value  because  it is equal  to life expectancy  in Mexico.
15  We assume  that both types have the same  utility function  in order to show in a more clear way the
effect of poor agents  to the having an important  demand  for savings  but no access  to the financial  system.
16 Notice that the endowment  of human capital  is now denoted  with lower- case letters rather  than with
upper-case.  This is because  now there will be several  working-age  generations  living at the same  time,
and we have to differentiate  each of them  with the total stock of human capital.
25Pt =O  fort=  1, ...,R.
Also,  since  individuals  only  care  about  their  own  well  being,  there  are  no
bequests  or  inheritances  so:  at(O)=  at(56)=  0.  Where  at(j)  are  assets  held  by  an
individual of age j at time t.
The first order condition for individuals of type 1 is:
t+  t  +  I  (39)
C,  +
and the equivalent expression for agents of type 2 is given by:
ct  1  +P  (40)
Since these agents do not receive interest payments, their consumption path cloes
not  depend  on  the  interest  rate.  Production  is  still  of  the  Cobb-Douglas  form  and
payments  to  factors  are  given by  equations  (17)  and  (18).  Now,  the total  stock. of
human capital is given by the sum of the endowments of each generation alive:
HI=  Zh  j)  141)
hU)  (:42)
j=O
H=H 1 + H2 (43)
Where h' (j)  is the stock of human capital held by agents of type 1 and age j  at
any  period.  Agents of  type  1 are  still assumed  to  hold  a  fraction y of the  stock  of
human capital and a fraction ,B  of the labor force. Similarly, total labor force is the sum
of generation size across all living generations.
1  5  51
Et =  ;  It1(44)
I=0
2  55  2 L2t =  "  EIf  (1)  (45)
j=0
where It(j)  is the number of persons of age j and type i alive at period t.
26I  = L  +L  2 (46)
Population is still assumed to grow at rate n:
Lt = (1 +n)Lt _ 1  (47)
Aggregation of fimancial  assets is as follows:
1  55  1  t-j+l  I
A;  =  1  n(l)(l+n)  at U()  (48)
2  55  2  t-j+1  2
A2  =  ,  ElZ(l)(l+n)  a7j)  t49)
t  t
At  =A;l +  A;  (50)
And the aggregate level of pension payments is the sum of individual pensions
across generations:
55 ~  2  t-  (51
pt  E  {I()+l6(l)1(l+n)t  -+pt(j)  (51)
3.1  Introducing Government
We  still  assume  that  govemnment  is  only  concerned  with  the  social  security
system and faces the same budget constraint as in the previous version:
Bt + I = Bt(l  +,,t) +Gt  _  Tswt  (HI  1 +f2  2)T  (2
As  in  the  two  period  version,  government  expenditures  G,  will  be  different
from zero only during the transition from the PAYG to the FF  system and they will be
equal to pensions paid to transitional workers. We assume that the level of debt is zero
before the reform.
3.2  The transition and the steady states under both systems
As  we  already  explained,  in  the  PAYG  system  the  government  uses
contributions  from  current  workers to pay  retirement  pensions  that  are  equal for  all
individuals.  This implies that:
27p
Pt='  55  (53)
E  [ I'  U+  2t0)
j=R
and:
P  1~~I1  22  (4 Pt =  T5sW  t(HLl+H  HL2t)  (54)
Therefore,  in the PAYG steady state Bt = Bt +  0  =.  The stock of capital in the
PAYG equilibrium is:
Kt  = A1 -B  (55) t
Therefore,  the equation that describes the evolution of the capital stock in the
PAYG steady state is:
Kt +1 =A; 1 -A t +  t(56)
3.3  The  Fully- Funded system
Recall that the adoption of a FF  system means that the government will receive
no more contributions,  but at the end of the transition,  it will no longer be responsible
of paying retirement pensions.  At the same time,  retirement pensions will now depend
directly on the contributions made to the social security during the working years.  This
implies  that  pension  amounts  will  be  different  for  our  two  types  of  individuals.
Specifically, pensions received by an individual of type i are given by:
R  R-s-l-i
I  (l+r)  h  w
Pt(_)=  5=  °  55-R  fI (1+rj  Rforj>R  (57)
That is, the balance accumulated in the individual accounts during the working
years  (contributions plus interest payments) will be  equal to  the value of the pensions
received during the retirement  years; there  is no intra-generation  redistribution. Also,
we  assume  that  this  value  will be  divided  across  the  retirement  years  so that  each
pension  will have the same value except for the interest that is paid on the remaining
balance of the retirement account.
Recall our assumption that the reform will give access to the financial system to
agents of type 2; their budget constraint in the FF  system is now:
2  2  2  2  2  2  =0(
at+  1 =  1 + rt)at  +(I - rs)hwt  + pt - h(ra  + hw)-c  (58)
and the equilibrium condition is:
28Kt+l  = At+l  -AtKt  (59)
3.4  The  Transition  from the PA  YG to the FF system
In order to obtain solutions for this model, we assign realistic values for the
parameters 17 and perform computer simulations  using the Gauss-Seidel  method' 8. This
method consists in using initial guesses for the vectors of factor prices, performning
iterations plugging these  guesses  into  the  first  order  conditions and,  with  the
consumption  paths implied by these conditions, obtaining aggregate levels of capital
and effective  labor. The iterations  continue until the factor prices consistent  with these
aggregate  levels of capital and labor are equal to the initial guesses. For a complete
description  of this solution  method see Auerbach  and Kotlikoff  (1987, chapter 4.)
We simulate the transition from a  PAYG to  a FF  system using alternative
forms of financing the transitional cost previously described.  Again we study the
effects of the reform on fiscal policy, capital accumulation  and income distribution;  in
this  section, in  addition to  distribution within generations, we discuss distribution
between generations.
We consider the case in which the fiscal policy consists in imposing  an income
tax such  that the level of debt is constant during the transition. In particular, we assume
that the level of debt is kept equal to zero.  Figure 3 shows the evolution of physical
capital along the transition between both systems for three different combinations  of
D and y . In the homogeneous  agent case, the steady state level of capital in the FF
system is 14.83  % higher than in the PAYG one; a result that is consistent with the
studies previously cited. Note that initially there is a decrease in the stock of capital:
the taxes needed to maintain a zero debt path have a crowding out effect on capital.
Twenty one years after the transition, the stock of physical capital reaches  its minimum
level: 0.25  % lower than the PAYG steady state value. It can also be seen that, as in the
two period model, the higher the fraction of the stock of units of effective labor in
hands of poor agents, the lower the steady state level of physical capital in the PAYG
steady state and, therefore, the higher its increase after the reform . In the , = 0.6, y
=0.8  case, for example, capital in the FF equilibrium  is  17.90% higher than in the
PAYG one.
Figure  4  shows changes in  intergenerational distribution. The vertical axis
depicts the percentual difference on lifetime wealth for generations born at different
years with respect to the generation  born 60 years before the reform.  l9 We can see that
those generations  born 55 or less years after the reform takes place, that is generations
that are alive by then, will see a decrease in their welfare.  (Generations  born before
that will not be affected  at all.) These generations  are worse off compared  to those born
after the reform because they do not perceive the benefits of a higher stock of capital
and,  therefore, of  a higher consumption path. Those that are born just  before the
reform lose the most because they have to continue with the old system and, at the
same time, they have to share (by paying income taxes) the reform's cost. Generations
17 We use the same  parameter  values  as in the two period version and we assume  that retirement  age R
is 45 years.
18 The simulations  were performed  using Gauss  software.
19 Here we measure  welfare  of the entire generation.
29born after the reform begins will be better off. In the homogeneous agent case, lifetime
wealth of generations born in the new FF  steady state (about 90 years after the reform)
will  be  6.28%  higher  than  that  of  generations  born  55  or  more  years  before  the
transition.  On  the  other  hand  those  generations  born  immediately  after  the  reform
perceive a 2.88 % increase in their lifetime wealth.
It  can also be  seen that all generations,  regardless of  their year  of birth,  will
have higher welfare as the fraction of units of effective labor in hands of agents of type
1 is lower.  For example, in the 3 =  0.4,  y = 0.7  case, generations born immediately
after  the  reform  have  a  lifetime  wealth  that  is  9.33 %  higher  than  their  equivalent
generations  in  the  homogeneous  agent  case.  Similarly,  individuals  born  before  the
reform,  in  cases  where  ,B and  y are  lower  than  1,  do  not  lose  as  much  as  in  the
homogeneous agent  case.  This  result  supports our  conclusion that  the  benefits  of
adopting a FF  system will be higher as the fraction of the population that does not have
access to the financial system in the PAYG system is higher.
Figures  5  and  6  show  the  evolution  wages  and  interest  rates  during  the
transition.  The higher levels of physical mean higher wages and lower interest rates. As
expected, wages increase more and interest rate fall more for lower values of D and y.
Figure  7 shows the changes in the income tax rate during  the transition.  This
rate  increases  as  the  generations  that  still  have  to  receive  pensions  paid  by  the
govemment  retire.  After the last generation that will be retired  under  the old scheme
retires (45 years) the income tax rate falls as the old scheme's pensioners die. As in the
two period version,  the income tax rate needed to maintain a constant level of debt is
higher with  higher values of  0 and  y: in the homogeneous agent case the income tax
rate is, at its peak, 7.97%,  whereas in the  3 = 0.4  , y =0.7  case this rate 5.56%.  In all
cases,  the income tax rate  reaches its maximum 46 years  after the reform  . Finally,
Figure  8, shows the transition cost as percentage of GDP (assuming that all transitional
workers  retire  under  the  old  system)  for  the  homogeneous  agent  case.  This  cost
remains steady for the first 45 years since, in that period,  each year one new generation
starts receiving pensions and one generation dies. After that, the cost starts to decrease
as no one else retires under the old system and as existing pensioners die.
4.  Conclusion
This  paper  presented  an  heterogeneous  agent  model  developed  to  study  the
transition  from  a  state-managed  Pay-as-you-go  social  security  system to  a  privately-
managed Fully-funded one.  We assumed that  agents can differ in their  human capital
endowments and in their access to the financial system.  We find that,  for some initial
distributions,  when access to  the financial  system  is restricted  for  some  individuals,
income distribution  may improve  with the privatization of the pension  system.  In the
case  in  which  there  is  complete  access  to  the  financial  system  before  the  reform,
however,  income distribution deteriorates in all cases,
Regardless  of  the  initial  distributions,  a  reform  of  the  type  described  here
increases the level of physical capital in the economy.  However,  the increase will be
larger the larger are the fraction of the population composed by poor individuals or the
higher their level of human capital.
30We also fmd that different initial distributions  will have different effects on the
fiscal policy needed to fimance  the reform. Similarly, different forms of financing the
reform will have different effects on intragenerational  distribution.  In the case in which
the government  decides to maintain  a constant  level of debt, generations  alive when the
refonn takes place will have lower lifetime earnings than those born after them. We
also find that the taxes needed to pay for transitional  workers' pensions will be higher
when the fraction of population with access to  the financial system in  the PAYG
equilibrium  is higher.
The results presented in this paper suggest that, before undertaking a  social
security reform, governments  should try to determine  whether such reform will signify
more access to the financial  system for a significant  number of workers since  this might
have considerable  effects in the fiscal costs and in the type of safety net programs that
will be required in order to minimize  the effects  on income distribution.
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